

Significant Points in Secretary McNamara's  
Testimony to the Senate Committee

McNamara

Council

Dissent

A) Air Objectives: 1) to reduce the flow and/or increase the cost of infiltration of men and supplies

2) raise the morale of the South Vietnamese people

3) make clear to Hanoi that they would have to pay a price in North for their aggression in South

B.) Bombing is a supplement and not a substitute for effective campaign in South.

**ON FILE OSD RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY**

The limitations of the air campaign =  
three topics

- 1) the objectives + achievements of air war
- 2) target recommendations of JCS + extent to which they are followed
- 3.) the proposals of the hawks:
  - a) Hot bombing can keep DRV to the table
  - b) " " can prevent flow of supplies into or through DRV

c) The campaign has been successful:

- raised morale in the South
- put a high price on aggression
- made infiltration more

difficult and costly

D.) Complete interdiction has never been considered possible

E.) DRV's war-making ability is dependent on imports of military goods & moving them South - the capacity of the transport system is very large and traffic is very small -- 15 tons per day in a pipeline with an outlet of 200 tons/day.

F.) DRV has had to divert  
some 500,000 people to  
cope with air attacks

G.) Bombing campaign is  
hurting DRV's war-making  
capability

H.) No campaign, short of one  
with population as target can  
force Hanoi into submission

I.) We strive constantly to  
maximize the cost of  
infiltration + to improve  
our air power — but no  
improvements can do much  
more than put a high  
price tag on aggression.

## Topic II - JCS Target Recommendations

A. OTL has 427 targets.

of which 68 not recommended.

Of 359, strikes authorized  
against 302 (85% of total)

On 57 of JCS recommended  
targets have not been authorized.

B. Strikes against the 57 will  
not materially shorten the  
war.

Shapiro says it will  
Wheeler says they  
are worthwhile

C. Of 57 -

7 seen by JCS of little value

9 are Pd facilities.

25 lesser targets in pop. areas.

4 significant " "

3 ports

4 airfields

5 buffer zone

D. For a few of these targets  
the risks of confrontation exceed  
military

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be considered but they cannot  
have different objectives than those we have.

Topic III

Hawks proposals -

They would change our objectives:

They believe air power can break the will or cut off supplies. They see air as a substitute rather than supplement

Breaking the Will

No evidence in intelligence reports that new campaign can break the will.

Indeed anger at US air attacks helps maintain popular support of Hanoi

Course of ground war, rather than scale of air attack is determining factor in "breaking will"

### Cutting Supplies

Capacity of LOC's and  
outside sources of supply  
so exceed the minimum  
flows necessary to sustain  
war at present level that  
they cannot be stopped  
by air attacks.

### Closure of Sea + Land Routes

Would interfere seriously  
with imports but the  
essentials needed to  
fight war are so small  
<sup>15-18</sup> tons a day v. actual  
imports of 5800 / + capacity  
of 1400

Military equipment  
comes by rail 550 tons  
a day

If Haiphong close  
land routes could  
move 84 w tons a day

If land routes reduced  
8% they move 20 percent  
of current imports.

Elem. of Haiphong would  
not elements ~~Sea imports~~  
as unhesed by PL strikes.

Bombing ports + mining  
harbors leads only to  
total reliance on land  
so would not be an  
effective means of stopping  
infiltration of supplies  
to GVN

A less discriminate program  
can do no more than  
our present careful program  
to slow ~~in~~ Approved For Release 2001/11/19 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000700020006-8  
would it "break the will"

A less selective system  
would involve risks too high  
to accept for its dubious  
prospects

Mining the harbors would  
be an act of war in int'l law sense

Closing of ports could induce  
strong & unpredictable Soviet  
reaction — increasing its  
support of DKV... w/ better  
weapons, w/ volunteer  
host US-Soviet relation, UN,  
or even direct Soviet intervention

Final decision is in the Soviets

Issues raised

Mc - There is not a direct relationship between level of bombing + forces required in the south.

Would air campaign have been more efficient w/out restriction + would it have reduced casualties in the South  
It would not have reduced casualties

Bombing targets earlier would not have reduced flow of men + material altho it would have increased the cost somewhat.

The difference in price to DRV would have been small --  $\frac{5}{4}$  million

We would have suffered greater losses if we went after the new targets earlier (we have learned new ~~sources, etc., equipment~~ for jamming, etc.)

Red China will come in -  
if they saw the destruction  
of govt of North Vietnam or denied  
of independence

Even though 85% of goods come  
from Hanoi military + only  
supporting is so small  
that you can have a dramatic  
reduction in total imports  
without affecting war material

15 tons a day seems small  
but it is agreed intelligence

p.697

In terms of \$ and,  
670 million from USSR  
120? 130 from China

We could win war w/out  
cutting off supplies from USSR  
Don't know how to do it  
Would create serious  
military risks

He runs them the 57, decide  
their importance, says he  
won't risk lives on them —  
YET they come up on  
THE NEW LISTS

We have destroyed 85 MIGS  
lost only 23 to MIGS  
(12 in last year)

\* Hartung won't the entry  
part for 85% of was material.  
About 100% of it comes by  
land

The senators believe more  
effective air & sea power  
can shorten the war

A CIA agent says  
morale is holding up  
and we can't break  
or weaken it by bombing

(16 Aug)

Moving sorties won't  
reduce casualties in  
South; not sure of return  
them well - since the  
size of flow of supplies  
to South from North  
is not bombing but  
the loc's in Laos &  
northern South Vietnam

Wheeler &  
McConnell disagree

The campaign has  
not reduced flow to  
South to point that  
no more than present  
levels of enemy forces  
in South has been maintained  
over last 18 months

(Ats CIA monthly  
(June 18 July)

436  
1244  
87  
44  
17

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Mc - 95%

Sharp - 58%  
42%

Mac = 95% of JCS

Share = 42 58% of JCS + Cincpac

436  
1244  
87.00  
1200

436

427

of which not struck = 187

of not authorized = 107

421  
242  
85

436

107

329 = authorized

as of Tuesday -

359 recommended  
85% 302 authorized  
→ not anywhere near 436 recommended

359

+ 68 not recommended

427 = total list of chiefs = operating target list

McCormick

contains JCS/CINCPAC target list as of 21 Aug =  
361 of which 84% not authorized

✓ Truck inventory per DICE

Feb 1965 = 9, 000

Current 10-12, 000

after we destroyed 4100 and  
damaged 4, 000

Of the 57 targets  
only a small number  
are very important and a  
substantial number of  
them would be considered  
very unimportant

Mac says most of  
the power plants they  
are not attempting  
to reconstruct